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Abstract
Human rights frameworks afford everyone the right to health and the right to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress and its applications. Both come together to create state obligations to ensure access 
to medicines and other health technologies. Though the impact of patents on access to high-quality, 
affordable medicines and health technologies has been well described, there has been little attention to the 
impact of trade secrecy law in this context. In this paper, we describe how trade secrecy protection comes 
into conflict with access to medicines—for example, by preventing researchers from accessing clinical 
trial data, undermining the scale-up of manufacturing in pandemics, and deterring whistleblowers 
from reporting industry misconduct. The paper proposes measures to diminish the conflict between 
trade secrecy and health that are consistent with international law and will advance health without 
undermining innovation.
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Introduction
The right to health is widely recognized in interna-
tional treaties,1 and every state has ratified at least 
one of the several international agreements that rec-
ognize it.2 The affirmative right to health necessarily 
entails access to medicines and other health technol-
ogies such as vaccines and diagnostics, as recognized 
by international bodies and domestic courts alike.3 
(In this paper, we use the shorthand “access to 
medicines” to refer to access to a variety of health 
technologies, including vaccines and diagnostics.) 
Access to medicines, in turn, requires institutional 
and legal arrangements that ensure that appropriate 
medicines are developed, tested, and made available 
equitably and at affordable prices. 
Realizing health rights, as one of us has 
emphasized, requires interventions in law and 
political economy.4 Political economy approaches 
to law recognize that law constructs markets and 
that the shape law gives to markets implicates 
values of equality and democracy—for example, 
by shaping who has access to health technologies. 
Intellectual property law is a key component of how 
law structures markets in, and access to, scientific 
advances. Patents, for example, are legally granted 
temporary monopolies that create both incentives 
for the development of medicines and barriers to 
affordable medicines. Safeguarding the right to 
health requires the international community and 
individual states to balance, adjust, or even over-
ride intellectual property provisions. 
A great deal of work has been done to illumi-
nate the relationship between patents and access 
to medicines. But the role that trade secrecy law, 
another type of intellectual property, plays in lim-
iting access to quality and affordable medicines has 
received far less attention. An emerging literature 
has begun to explicate how the protection of trade 
secrets and confidential corporate information cre-
ates barriers to data and information that the public 
has vital interests in accessing, including informa-
tion about voting technologies, criminal justice 
and surveillance technologies, and environmental 
hazards. This opaqueness compromises important 
public interests in democratic accountability and 
public health and safety.5 This paper adds to that 
literature, detailing how trade secrecy can also im-
pede access to information that is needed to ensure 
quality, affordable medicines, thereby burdening 
the public’s right to health and its right to enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress and its applications.6 
As we describe, trade secrecy may be invoked in 
a manner that prevents public access to clinical 
trial data, drug pricing data, evidence of corporate 
wrongdoing, manufacturing information needed 
to decentralize production, or biologic resources 
important to treatment and vaccine development. 
Access to these resources is particularly acute 
now, while the world is struggling to respond to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. On October 2, 2020, India 
and South Africa submitted a communication to 
the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) proposing a waiver of sec-
tions 1, 4, 5, and 7 of part II of the TRIPS Agreement 
in order to support measures to prevent, treat, and 
contain COVID-19.7 The proposal suggests waiving 
protections of undisclosed information, described 
in TRIPS section 7. This is of special importance due 
to the rapid development of treatments and vaccines 
for COVID-19, and the dramatic global disparities 
in access to these technologies. Although the public 
made extraordinary investments in private compa-
nies’ vaccine research and development, details of 
clinical trial data and government contracts remain 
secret. For example, when immense public pressure 
led to the release of US vaccine contracts in No-
vember 2020, the public learned that the Johnson & 
Johnson contract explicitly allowed the company to 
keep secret “production/manufacturing know-how, 
trade secrets, [and] clinical data.”8 Similarly, the 
European Commission’s first two publicly released 
vaccine contracts include generous redactions of 
alleged “confidential information,” including the 
price per dose, the amount paid up front, and the 
rollout schedule.9 We show why access to infor-
mation that companies may (rightly or wrongly) 
designate as trade secrets can be important for 
public health, why the problem is becoming more 
acute, and how states can interpret or revise trade 
secrecy protections to enable them to promote ac-
cess to medicines.
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The rise of trade secret protections 
Trade secrecy law generally protects information 
that is secret, commercially valuable because it is 
secret, and subject to reasonable efforts to protect 
its secrecy. Trade secret protections are distinct 
from patents and copyrights. In certain ways, they 
are weaker: unlike patents, trade secrets are not 
protected from independent invention, and they 
can be used or disclosed if they are discovered by 
“fair” means. In other ways, they are stronger: both 
patents and copyright protection are limited to a 
specific number of years, but trade secret protec-
tions can be indefinite. Companies can claim trade 
secret protection without any registration, and the 
scope of these rights often become clear only after 
litigation. Trade secret protections are also not sub-
ject to clear exceptions and limitations, such as the 
“fair use” right in copyright. 
The history of trade secrecy law is obscure and 
disputed, and no major body of scholarship sum-
marizes the transnational evolution of trade secret 
protection. Broadly speaking, however, protection 
for trade secrecy follows an arc similar to other 
forms of intellectual property, growing stronger in 
many jurisdictions in recent decades.10
One difficulty tracing the evolution of trade 
secrecy law around the world is the wide array of 
ways that states protect trade secrets. Many com-
mon law legal traditions, for example, have long 
protected certain kinds of business information 
through the rubric of unfair competition law or 
contract law.11 A competitor stealing information 
from another could be liable in tort, and an em-
ployee who reveals a secret they promised to protect 
could be liable in contract. Over time, courts have 
expanded these rights—for example, by implying 
contracts in certain settings and by preventing 
the use of trade secrets by some third parties who 
obtain them improperly. In civil law settings, com-
mercial secrets have commonly received protection 
under regulation and statute, such as general laws 
protecting fair competition.12 Many Asian countries 
have historically protected trade secrets through 
informal norms and business relationships rather 
than through legal means. Countries have thus 
not always had—and still today do not necessarily 
have—a special domain of “trade secrets law.” In 
India, for example, commercial secrets are not pro-
tected as such, but can be protected via the law of 
contracts and misappropriation. In Germany, trade 
secrets are protected in a general fair competition 
statute. In Malaysia, the law of confidence gener-
ally governs confidential commercial information, 
while in Chile the only reference to trade secrets is 
in criminal law provisions.
In the United States, however, there are a few 
clear inflection points that show the increased 
strength of this area of law. Until the 1980s, the 
leading source of guidance for courts was the Re-
statement (First) on Torts, which made it clear that 
trade secrets were protected only in tort, as a viola-
tion of “of relationally specific duties,” and did not 
reflect any “right of property in the idea.”13 In 1984, 
however, the US Supreme Court declared that trade 
secret rights were indeed a kind of property for the 
purposes of the US Constitution and thus could be 
protected from unlawful “takings” of private prop-
erty—meaning that a government that improperly 
revealed a trade secret would be required to pay 
compensation.14 Early cases in the US and the First 
Restatement often treated the core information 
protectable by trade secrecy as technical infor-
mation about industrial processes and formulas.15 
Today, the US legal framework, shaped largely by 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, defines the scope 
of trade secrets far more broadly, as covering any 
“information” that is commercially valuable, secret, 
and subject to reasonable efforts to keep it secret.16 
In 2016, the US Congress additionally passed the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act, expanding the law again 
by providing federal jurisdiction for cases involving 
the misappropriation of trade secrets. After advo-
cacy regarding the conflict of trade secrets with 
public interests in access to information, the law 
also incorporated limited “whistleblower” protec-
tions, limiting criminal and civil liability for those 
disclosing a trade secret pursuant to reporting a 
suspected violation of the law.17 
In combination with the rise of information 
technologies and the “informationalization” of the 
economy, these shifts have had substantial impli-
cations. Businesses in the United States can now 
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claim as their property not just secret formulas but 
an almost limitless range of information and data, 
even if such claims might not hold up in court. 
The implications for public access to information 
are formidable. In 2001, for example, a US appeals 
court held that a state could not require the public 
disclosure of all of the ingredients in cigarettes, 
even if this disclosure might benefit public health, 
unless the state first paid the company for “taking” 
its trade secrets.18 
The 1980s and 1990s also marked a moment 
when the United States and other wealthy coun-
tries made strengthened intellectual property law 
a significant trade priority, pressing developing 
countries in particular to adopt stronger intel-
lectual property rights.19 The WTO’s 1995 TRIPS 
Agreement played a significant role here. All mem-
bers of the WTO must adhere to it, and violations 
of TRIPS are actionable in dispute resolution. Trade 
sanctions are also possible where countries do not 
bring their law into compliance.20 Under article 
39 of TRIPS, countries must provide protection 
for “undisclosed information,” provided that the 
information is sufficiently secret, “has commercial 
value because it is secret,” and has been “subject 
to reasonable steps under the circumstances” to 
keep it secret. Drafters refrained from using the 
term “trade secret” to avoid associations with any 
particular legal system, and the requirement of 
protection for “undisclosed information” does not 
require a US-style trade secrets law.21 International 
commitments thus give countries many flexibilities 
with respect to how they implement protection.22 
Wealthy countries have regularly sought to 
increase protections for trade secrets in bilateral 
and multilateral agreements.23 For example, the re-
cent United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the 
result of the renegotiation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, includes “the most robust 
protection for trade secrets of any prior [US] agree-
ment.”24 It obligates parties to provide both civil 
and criminal remedies for the misappropriation 
of trade secrets, judicial procedures to prevent the 
disclosure of trade secrets during litigation, and 
corresponding penalties. These measures were not 
required by earlier instruments such as TRIPS. The 
agreement also makes it more difficult for regula-
tors to seek “confidential business information” 
from commercial entities for certain products.25 
This and other bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments contribute to the rising floor of international 
trade secrecy protections. 
As noted above, there do remain meaningful 
cross-jurisdiction differences in the scope of trade 
secret protections. But continued trade pressure 
and efforts to attract foreign investment have led to 
a recent wave of standardization, with major laws 
protecting trade secrets recently passed around 
the world, including in China, Thailand, Taiwan, 
and Japan.26 The European Parliament and Coun-
cil adopted a directive in 2016, which requires all 
European Union (EU) member states to amend 
their existing laws to comply with a minimum 
level of trade secrecy protection. Importantly, the 
directive provides some room for local variation in 
implementation and also provides exceptions to the 
enforcement of trade secret laws where, for exam-
ple, disclosure of the trade secret was for purposes 
of reporting wrongdoing or protecting a “legitimate 
interest recognized by Union or national law.”27 
Uses of trade secrets and consequences for 
access to medicines
As the scope of protectable trade secrets has ex-
panded, companies have claimed trade secret or 
trade secret-like protections for many types of in-
formation relevant to health. The consequences for 
the ability of all people to access safe and affordable 
medicines are significant. 
Clinical trial data 
Understanding the safety and efficacy of medicines 
on the market is crucial for public health.28 Phar-
maceutical companies regularly collect safety and 
efficacy data, including individual participant data, 
metadata (such as trial protocols for interpreting 
results), and summary-level data.29 Health regula-
tors require companies to submit clinical trial data 
to assess the safety and efficacy of proposed medi-
cines. (Fewer data may be required for technologies 
such as diagnostics, and there is no clear regulatory 
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framework yet for newer technologies such as 
health apps.) Companies do, however, commonly 
invoke trade secret protections to prevent or limit 
the disclosure of data to outside researchers or the 
public.
Keeping such data secret has significant con-
sequences. First, regulators are often understaffed 
and under pressure to approve medicines quickly, 
and they sometimes make mistakes. Without ac-
cess to clinical trial data, researchers cannot verify 
or investigate a medicine’s claimed benefits and 
risks. There are many examples where serious—
sometimes deadly—side effects, or a lack of efficacy, 
were revealed only many years after a drug has 
been on the market, because clinical trial data were 
kept secret from researchers. Prominent examples 
include rofecoxib (Vioxx), estrogen hormone ther-
apy (Prempro), and extended-release oxycodone 
(OxyContin).30 
Clinical trial secrecy can also obstruct the 
proper operation of health technology assessments, 
which contribute to health care provision and 
reform. Health technology assessments “provide 
a range of stakeholders … with accessible, usable 
and evidence-based information to guide decisions 
about the use and diffusion of technology and 
efficient allocation of resources.”31 For example, 
they are used to make recommendations about the 
proper pricing of medicines and how to channel 
funds toward research that will have the most value 
for patients. However, health technology assess-
ments can only function when they have sufficient 
information about the drugs and devices they are 
assessing. 
Researchers can also make new uses of clin-
ical trial data where they are available, such as to 
predict how subgroups will respond to a medicine 
or to understand the natural course of a disease. In 
the case of COVID-19 vaccines, for example, access 
to clinical trial data and post-market surveillance 
data may help researchers understand more about 
COVID-19 infection and immune responses, as well 
as ask new questions about the safety and efficacy 
of the vaccines.32 Strong advocacy around access to 
data has had a significant impact in this context. US 
regulators released detailed summaries—although 
not all data—about vaccines during the regulatory 
process, and companies have published key trials 
relatively quickly. These measures have helped 
scientists understand and debate their efficacy and 
have likely bolstered public trust in regulatory pro-
cesses and vaccines.
Access to study protocols is critical for al-
lowing researchers to interpret trial results and to 
evaluate whether a study’s design can produce the 
information needed. For example, when several 
companies testing COVID-19 vaccines, after public 
pressure, voluntarily agreed to release the secret 
protocols for their studies, this allowed researchers 
to evaluate the endpoints used, enabling debate 
about how well the vaccines will protect against 
transmission and not just against severe disease. 
When protocols are public, it is also possible to 
identify improper “outcome switching” or “data 
dredging,” which occurs when researchers change 
the primary outcome measures during the analysis 
stage from those identified in the study protocol 
to those that make their study results appear more 
favorable.33 
Second, inhibiting public access to clinical tri-
al data undermines the development of new drugs. 
Under the current regime, companies and regula-
tors need not disclose the existence of, much less 
the data from, failed or abandoned preclinical stud-
ies and clinical trials.34 This practice drives up the 
costs of drug development and undermines inno-
vation because researchers cannot “learn from the 
failures of previous medical products in subsequent 
research programs.”35 Lack of access to this infor-
mation may result in unnecessary and unethical 
human and animal experimentation as companies 
remake and retest unsuccessful compounds.
Engineering and manufacturing data 
Even after patent and data exclusivity periods 
for drugs expire, trade secret protections permit 
pharmaceutical companies to keep the precise 
composition or manufacturing process for medica-
tions confidential. This effectively slows the release 
of generic competitor drugs by preventing their re-
liance on existing engineering and manufacturing 
data. As a consequence, drug companies can pre-
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serve monopolies on medications that are difficult 
to reverse engineer. 
Trade secret protections can effectively 
lengthen exclusivity periods for biological medi-
cines in particular. In the case of “small molecule” 
medicines, which are synthesized in chemical reac-
tions, a researcher can chemically reverse engineer 
the product. However, biologics, a newer group of 
medications that are often grown in or derived from 
living organisms, are more difficult to replicate. 
Biologics, composed of complex protein or other 
macromolecules and compositions, are compar-
atively difficult to produce, and their efficacy and 
safety depend on the specific conditions of their 
manufacture.36 To produce follow-on biologics, 
researchers would benefit from access to manufac-
turing information, which includes the specific cell 
line used, the host organism from which the cells 
were taken, the variable introduced to arrive at the 
final cell line selection, the method of optimization 
for the culture medium, the production environ-
ment used to grow the cells, and the procedure for 
isolation and purification of the relevant protein, 
among other data.37
Access to these alleged trade secret resources 
and information would also lighten the regulatory 
burden and therefore hasten consumers’ access to 
critical medicines. Health regulators treat biosim-
ilars differently from small-molecule medications. 
For example, the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) currently approves biosimilars only if testing 
demonstrates that they are sufficiently biosimilar 
to the original product.38 However, these time-con-
suming testing requirements could be simplified if 
regulators could be confident that the biosimilar 
was produced with high fidelity to the originator’s 
production. The licensing of trade secrets can allow 
production under the originator’s regulatory ap-
proval, and information exchange can also enable 
independent production of biological generics or 
biosimilars. Without access to alleged trade secret 
biologic resources and production information, the 
approval of biosimilars can take longer, leading to 
higher prices for originator products.39 This ulti-
mately drives up the cost of health care and reduces 
patients’ access to critical, cutting-edge biological 
vaccines and treatments for conditions, including 
rheumatoid arthritis, anemia, multiple sclerosis, 
and cancer.40 Given the importance of the rapid 
scale-up of COVID-19 vaccines around the world, 
many have advocated for the need for the transfer 
and licensing of manufacturing information in this 
context.41
Trade secret protections may also be used to 
inhibit access to engineering and manufacturing 
data for vaccines and diagnostics, such as those 
critical to resolving the ongoing COVID-19 crisis.42 
Most diagnostics, such as those used for rapid 
testing for the virus, “are being developed commer-
cially and with proprietary technology,” meaning 
that concerns about proprietary barriers to scale-
up are particularly acute.43 And while a great deal 
of public funding is being dedicated to developing 
vaccines and therapeutics, there does not appear 
to be any concerted effort on the part of funders 
to insist on either open access to resulting data or 
the sharing of trade secrets to ensure the possibil-
ity of competitive manufacture.44 To resolve this 
pandemic, a coordinated effort must be made to 
increase capacity for testing, tracing, vaccinating, 
and treating, particularly among developing and 
the least developed countries. Sharing data and 
manufacturing know-how for diagnostics and vac-
cines will be crucial for enhancing production and 
ultimately mitigating the harms of the COVID-19 
pandemic. Trade secrecy laws obstruct these efforts. 
Data related to artificial intelligence
Artificial intelligence will likely permit important 
advances in health care in the coming years and 
decades. A subset of artificial intelligence known 
as “machine learning” uses computer algorithms to 
analyze large amounts of data, to identify patterns, 
and to use these patterns to make predictions. The 
technology is already widely deployed to deter-
mine who receives health and disability benefits, 
to improve patient outcomes, to connect eligible 
patients to clinical trials, and to promote drug 
development.45 
Without access to the algorithm and its un-
derlying raw data, it can be difficult to identify 
problems with these systems. This is a serious 
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concern, because despite the perception of these 
systems as “intelligent,” well-known biases can af-
fect them.46 Access to algorithms and training data 
not only allows for better evaluation but also allows 
researchers with public health priorities in mind 
to improve these technologies. Yet companies may 
invoke trade secrets to guard predictive algorithms, 
related artificial intelligence and machine learning 
techniques, and the large datasets that these require 
to function. 
Drug pricing data
Pharmaceutical companies have invoked trade 
secret protections and trade secret-like protec-
tions to limit access to various types of financial 
information, including drug prices, research and 
development costs, manufacturing costs, and 
details regarding financial arrangements. In the 
United States, for example, companies have lit-
igated against transparency laws that sought to 
require them to make the prices of their medicines 
known to the public (when they might otherwise 
remain obscured by secret rebates or other deals). 
Collectively, we refer to these as “drug pricing 
data” because they are all relevant to the matter of 
fair pricing. The consequences of protecting this 
information are significant. A lack of transparent 
pricing information fuels high drug prices, while 
obscuring the research and development costs lim-
its our ability to calibrate innovation policy and to 
identify price gouging. 
Information about wrongdoing 
Whistleblowers are individuals—commonly 
employees—who reveal secret corporate informa-
tion in order to hold companies accountable for 
causing public harm. In some jurisdictions, trade 
secret law recognizes an exception when the dis-
closure involves “information that is relevant to 
public health or safety, or to the commission of a 
crime or a tort, or to other matters of substantial 
public concern.”47 However, such exceptions may 
provide little solace to whistleblowers. In practice, 
“potential whistleblowers face a gauntlet of legal 
impediments, indoctrination policies, financial 
risks, and workplace and social pressures discour-
aging reporting of illegal conduct.”48 For example, 
in the United States, employees have been found 
liable for misappropriation for giving corporate 
files to their attorneys, even in instances where they 
were seeking to disclose illegal conduct.49
The stakes for establishing robust whistleblow-
ing exceptions are high: insufficient protections 
coupled with broad trade secrecy law can pose a 
risk to public health. Without these protections, 
employees may not disclose misconduct or errors 
made by health care providers or firms.
Harmonizing trade secrecy law with the right 
to health 
Proponents of trade secrecy protections contend 
that these protections encourage innovation by 
limiting the flow of proprietary information. How-
ever, many of the kinds of data being claimed as 
trade secrets are not clearly trade secrets. 
One problem, to which some of the solutions 
we describe below are addressed, is that trade se-
cret law is very fact specific, making it hard to rule 
out the possibility of trade secret protection for 
any particular kind of information. However, it is 
important to recognize that close scrutiny often 
reveals trade secret claims to be inappropriate and 
that careful studies have concluded that trade secret 
law, properly understood, does not protect many 
categories of information relevant to health. For ex-
ample, although courts in the United States have at 
times accepted the idea that prices can be trade se-
crets with little analysis, there are good arguments 
based on the theory and purpose of trade secrets 
law that the price alone should not be afforded such 
protection. One argument is that price is simply 
a deal point representing the culmination of ad-
verse negotiations between buyers and sellers and 
is not “an origin point for future development.”50 
Concealing prices does not further innovation; it 
simply undermines the capacity of competitors to 
provide competitive pricing—hardly a purpose of 
trade secrecy.51
Many types of clinical trial data should also 
not be properly considered trade secrets. Most safe-
ty and efficacy data, for example, will not confer an 
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advantage to competitors of the relevant kind—they 
cannot, for instance, be used to market another 
product or to reduce the costs of a competitor.52 The 
data might be privately valuable to the originator 
because they would reveal its product as harmful, 
but that is not the kind of value that trade secrecy 
law protects. Notably, the European Medical As-
sociation (EMA) has recognized in data-sharing 
regulations that many kinds of safety and efficacy 
data, such as trial endpoints, statistical methods, 
and adverse event information, are not protected 
confidential commercial information.53 The EMA 
has also concluded that clinical trial protocols do 
not qualify.54 US courts have held the same, noting 
that they contain “no information about secret 
formulas or rare treatment methods” and do not 
identify innovative procedures or techniques.55 
Timing can also influence whether the disclo-
sure of information would produce a competitive 
harm. For example, releasing research and devel-
opment costs after sending the relevant product to 
market would be unlikely to produce a competitive 
disadvantage.56 In addition, the disclosure of aggre-
gated data is unlikely to result in competitive harm. 
How, then, can states create or expand 
safeguards against overly expansive trade secret 
protections? Three areas deserve particular at-
tention. First, states should guard against the 
entrenchment of trade secrets as human rights or 
constitutional rights and reject attempts to en-
shrine stronger trade secrets law in international 
law, particularly without adequate and explicit pro-
tection of safeguards. Second, states should protect 
the public’s interest in health data by limiting trade 
secret law and allowing it to be overridden where 
public health benefits are salient. Third, countries 
should adopt robust whistleblower safeguards. 
Avoiding the entrenchment of trade secret 
protections 
Trade secret law has not been upwardly harmonized 
in international law to the same degree as other 
kinds of intellectual property. It will be important 
for countries to maintain policy space to modify 
and adjust domestic trade secret law, particularly 
given how rapidly information technologies are 
evolving and the broad scope of trade secret law 
today. 
Like other forms of intellectual property, 
trade secret rights are predominantly held by 
corporations and do not have the status of human 
rights, nor should they. These rights emerged out 
of practices that protected commercial morality 
and fairness between business competitors, and 
they have no grounding in the rights reflected in 
international human rights treaties. 
States should also consider carefully the 
implications of treating trade secrecy as a form 
of property subject to protection under domestic 
constitutional law. The US experience shows that 
treating trade secrets as constitutionally protected 
property creates real risks for the publicity of health 
information, as in the tobacco case mentioned 
above. If trade secrets are protected as property, 
states are more limited in their ability to require 
the sharing of health data to improve outcomes 
or to develop new technologies, for example, be-
cause they may only do so after compensating 
the originator. Trade secret law is also plausibly 
understood more as a means to regulate behavior 
in the commercial sphere—a kind of tort or unfair 
competition law—rather than a right that is “good 
against the world” that should properly be deemed 
“property” for constitutional purposes. It is also not 
obvious that judicial review and mandatory com-
pensation are essential to protect private interests: 
states can voluntarily afford compensation to com-
panies when needed to protect incentives without 
judicial mandates. 
Allowing public interest exceptions to trade 
secrecy
Public interest exceptions to trade secrecy can help 
ensure that data can be shared to benefit public 
health. These exceptions can be codified in at least 
four ways: first, states can require the proactive 
disclosure of health information where there is no 
conflict with trade secrecy law; second, states can 
exclude information from the scope of trade secret 
protections; third, states can adopt “balancing 
tests” that allow the release of trade secrets where 
the public’s interest outweighs private harm; and 
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fourth, states can use post hoc techniques such as 
intellectual property “pools” and compensation 
schemes to overcome barriers to data sharing.
First, mandatory, proactive disclosure require-
ments for certain health and safety information can 
advance the public interest. The scope and timing 
of these disclosure requirements can be carefully 
tailored to balance industry interests and public 
health concerns. For example, in the United States, 
as part of a settlement in a lawsuit brought by Pub-
lic Citizen, the FDA began releasing key advisory 
committee materials, such as safety and efficacy 
data and FDA reviews of new drug applications, 
on its website 24 hours before advisory committee 
meetings.57 Previously, these materials were accessi-
ble to the public only after a drug was approved. The 
careful timing requirements on these mandatory 
disclosures allow interested parties to participate 
meaningfully in committee meetings, while also 
negating industry arguments that disclosure will 
unduly benefit competitors. The United States also 
releases a substantial amount of summary data via 
a website called ClinicalTrials.gov, under a statu-
tory mandate that requires such data to be shared. 
The data involved—summary information about 
trials underway and their results—are general 
enough that companies have not argued that the 
law “takes” their property or improperly discloses 
trade secrets. A great deal of important summary 
information that would otherwise be held in secret 
has been disclosed in this fashion. A key require-
ment for this disclosure is a regulatory requirement 
for data sharing from the private company to reg-
ulators; countries should ensure that the right to 
market medicines is contingent on the transfer of 
relevant data to regulators and should make clear 
that they will disclose such information to the pub-
lic as needed to protect public health. 
Proactive disclosure statutes can also be styled 
to create a presumption of transparency rather 
than confidentiality. Vanessa’s Law, adopted in 
Canada in 2014, requires manufacturers to release 
certain clinical trial data and provides the minister 
of health discretion to release additional informa-
tion (including confidential business information) 
without the drug maker’s consent, if the minister 
“believes that the product may present a serious 
risk of injury to human health.”58 While Vanessa’s 
Law and its amendments provide procedures for 
companies to object to disclosures, the public’s in-
terest is presumptively safeguarded. 59 There must 
also be efforts to monitor how laws providing for 
mandatory disclosure are implemented at the reg-
ulatory level. 
Second, excluding certain public health infor-
mation from the scope of trade secret protections can 
advance the public interest. Some information can 
be released, as described above, because it does not 
meet the definition of a trade secret. But states can 
also amend existing trade secret laws to broaden 
the ability to safely disclose information, wherever 
it would benefit health and safety. A narrower defi-
nition of trade secrets that excludes information of 
public interest could help enable more information 
to be disclosed through public information requests 
and limit measures that companies might take to 
threaten whistleblowers. It may also disincentivize 
companies from filing gratuitous trade secrets law-
suits. An exclusion of health and safety information 
from the proprietary scope of trade secrecy also 
resolves concerns that mandated disclosures con-
stitute illegal government takings. 
Third, affording public health weight in bal-
ancing tests can advance the public interest. Many 
countries already incorporate public interest over-
rides or balancing tests into their information access 
laws. The aforementioned EU directive explicitly 
allows for EU or national rules that require the 
public disclosure of trade secrets for the purpose of 
protecting the public interest.60 In the United King-
dom, the Freedom of Information Act “subjects its 
‘commercial interests’ exemption to a public interest 
balancing test: a public authority may only refuse to 
provide confidential information if it believes that, 
‘in all the circumstances of the case, the public 
interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs 
the public interest in disclosing the information.’”61 
Similarly, in India, the Right to Information Act of 
2005 stipulates that protected information may be 
disclosed once a “competent authority is satisfied 
that larger public interest warrants the disclosure 
of such information.” The law further states that “a 
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public authority may allow access to information, 
if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the 
harm to the protected interests.”62
Countries that do not have such balancing 
tests should consider adopting them. In the United 
States, for example, the Freedom of Information 
Act lacks clarity on when the public interest should 
be balanced against private rights. US courts regu-
larly weigh the public interest when parties seek to 
withhold information under exemption 6 (personal 
privacy interests) and exemption 7 (governing 
information collected for law enforcement purpos-
es). Recent cases arguing that the same balancing 
applies under exemption 4, which governs trade 
secrets and confidential commercial information, 
are currently pending in courts.63 
Fourth, developing mechanisms such as invol-
untary licenses or intellectual property “pools” can 
override previously established in appropriate situa-
tions. If data have already been declared protected 
as trade secrets, post hoc approaches for disclosure 
may be necessary. 
Where such data need to be pooled from many 
sources, governments can seek to create voluntary 
or mandatory “pools” that organize the terms un-
der which such data will be shared. Recently, for 
example, the president and minister of health of 
Costa Rica wrote to the World Health Organiza-
tion, urging it to “undertake an effort to pool rights 
and technologies … useful for the detection, pre-
vention, control, and treatment of the COVID-19 
pandemic.”64 This effort would make available 
via voluntary contribution all relevant research 
and other information related to the COVID-19 
response without conventional intellectual prop-
erty barriers, in order to encourage “follow-on” 
research and fast-track development of emerging 
technology.65 The pool also ideally would provide 
manufacturers license to use needed data once a 
working technology is found.66 States may also 
need to revise their laws to enable the entrance of 
generics and biosimilars where compulsory licens-
es on patents and data have been issued, but data 
exclusivity barriers exist. This post hoc approach 
to pooling trade secrecy information (among other 
intellectual property) may be particularly import-
ant in emergencies, when longer-term solutions 
may be impractical and a focus on particular tech-
nologies may be justified. However, a large-scale 
voluntary waiver of numerous intellectual prop-
erty protections may work only when there is near 
universal consensus regarding the urgency of the 
public health interests at play, and non-voluntary 
sharing may be required.
Outside of pools, narrower mechanisms such 
as involuntary licenses for the disclosure of specific 
information, similar to compulsory licenses avail-
able in patents, should also be made available. These 
licenses can be granted whenever public health 
events arise that make the disclosure of data nec-
essary, despite previous judgments or declarations 
regarding their protected status. This is especially 
important when the use of such data would lead 
to more accessible medical products, such as is the 
case with biosimilar or bioequivalent drugs and 
vaccines, which often rely on clinical trial data 
from originator drugs during the approval process.
Compensation can be afforded in these cases, 
where disclosure is to or for the benefit of com-
petitors. For example, in some instances when 
regulators have allowed test data to be relied on 
by subsequent entrants to a market, they have also 
established liability schemes to ensure some lim-
ited payment to those who funded the creation of 
the data.67 These schemes both dampen opposition 
from originator companies and address concerns 
about takings in the rare cases where these might 
have merit. 
Strengthening whistleblower protections 
In order to safeguard access to safe and afford-
able medicines, trade secrecy law must provide 
sufficient protections for whistleblowers. A model 
whistleblower protection regime would (1) include 
a reasonable belief standard and cover both illegal 
conduct and wrongdoing; (2) reduce the risk of 
negative consequences for whistleblowers; and (3) 
provide for infrastructure, resources, and report-
ing channels that facilitate disclosure.68 
Laws should facilitate disclosures by anyone 
who has a reasonable belief that they may expose 
illegal conduct or wrongdoing—even where disclo-
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sures may contain trade secrets.69 The reasonable 
belief standard helps ensure that whistleblowers 
do not bear too heavy a burden of proof. For ex-
ample, the EU directive protects the disclosure of 
information that the whistleblower perceives as 
either illegal conduct or wrongdoing, in contrast 
to US federal law, which protects the disclosure 
only of illegal conduct. The EU standard protects 
those without legal expertise and those who seek 
to report unethical behavior that harms the public 
interest.
Whistleblower protections must also ensure 
the welfare of those making disclosures. Wher-
ever possible, whistleblowers should be allowed 
anonymity to prevent workplace retaliation. In-
terim relief from courts is also necessary where 
workplace harassment does occur. To alleviate risk 
further, when disclosures fail to meet a reasonable 
belief standard, the law should not provide for 
onerous remedies against whistleblowers, as these 
disincentivize disclosures that may be valuable to 
the public. 
Regulatory protections for whistleblowers 
are meaningful only if accompanied by infra-
structure and resources that support disclosure. 
Organizations and individuals that facilitate 
whistleblowing—such as attorneys and nongov-
ernmental organizations—must be afforded the 
same protections as whistleblowers themselves. 
Employees must also be informed of their rights as 
potential whistleblowers and must have access to 
pro bono legal representation when needed. 
Addressing counter-arguments: 
International obligations and innovation 
The measures promoted above will neither con-
travene international law nor unduly undermine 
innovation. As described in the first section, 
international law requires that states implement 
trade secrecy protections in a manner tailored to 
protect the right to access essential medicines. The 
TRIPS Agreement provides individual states broad 
leeway in interpreting the purposefully flexible 
requirements to prevent “undisclosed information” 
from being used “in a manner contrary to honest 
commercial practices.”70 Nothing in article 39.2 
prohibits states from creating exceptions to trade 
secrecy protections, appropriately narrowing trade 
secret protections, or mandating the sharing of 
trade secrets where this would benefit health and 
competition. TRIPS also includes broadly stated 
purposes, for example noting in article 8 that mem-
bers may “adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health,” “promote the public interest,” and 
“prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights” 
as long as the measures are otherwise consistent 
with the agreement.71 Article 7 also makes clear that 
intellectual property rights should be implemented 
in a manner that “contribute[s] to the promotion 
of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations.” To that end, not only do these 
proposed measures comply with TRIPS, but they 
also facilitate the realization of some of the agree-
ment’s core principles.72 
In addition, state practice suggests that many 
of the measures we propose are considered by mem-
bers to be consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. 
Various states have already adopted public interest 
measures similar to those recommended by this 
paper. For example, the FDA, the EMA, and Health 
Canada already proactively disclose certain clinical 
trial data. The laws of several countries—including 
England, Scotland, and India—compel the disclo-
sure of confidential commercial information where 
there exists an overriding public interest.73 Efforts 
to refine and limit trade secrecy laws through the 
countervailing safeguards for access to medicines 
that we describe, are, we believe, fully consistent 
with the flexible international protections for un-
disclosed information. 
Advocates for broad trade secret protections 
contend that trade secrecy law encourages inno-
vation and so serves the public good. Under this 
reasoning, trade secret protections ensure profits 
for innovators by discouraging “free riding.”74 
They also reduce the need for companies to invest 
in inefficient security measures.75 Others see trade 
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secrecy protection as an important supplement to 
patent law because it does not require registration, 
application, or publication and is low cost and long 
lasting.76 
It is important to recognize, however, that 
overly broad trade secrecy law can impede inno-
vation in a multitude of ways. Trade secrecy and 
other intellectual property protections can create 
dynamic inefficiencies by increasing the cost 
of inputs—especially in the research context—
thereby frustrating innovation.77 Restrictions on 
the exchange of information—for example, by 
discouraging the movement of employees to new 
employers—can also reduce spillovers of infor-
mation to other firms. The unlimited duration of 
trade secret law is also problematic from an inno-
vation perspective, because companies can prevent 
public access forever, avoiding the “quid pro quo” 
disclosures of patent law. Indefinite protection is 
also economically unnecessary under conventional 
assumptions that companies “discount” the pres-
ent-day value of protection that exists many years 
in the future. 
Moreover, in general, exclusive rights to in-
formation create inefficiencies because information 
has a marginal cost of zero: it is costless to allow 
others to enjoy knowledge once it is created, and so 
from a static perspective should be priced at zero. 
Limiting access to knowledge may be desirable if 
it is needed to prevent free-riding problems. But, 
even without trade secrecy protections, compa-
nies would still produce much of the information 
that trade secrecy laws cover today. For example, 
businesses create a great deal of secret information 
simply because it is required by their business, in-
cluding data demanded by regulators, and prices. A 
lot of secret information is not expensive to create, 
meaning that it is not subject to real free-riding 
problems. In addition, as trade secrecy law has 
expanded, it has come to implicate public inter-
ests—including interests in access to information 
about products and corporate behavior—that are 
essential to democracy and the public good. Those 
who describe the incentive effects of trade secrets 
law rarely consider these broad public implications, 
the measures that may be needed to ensure that 
trade secrets do not overprotect information that 
would be created anyway, or the law’s interference 
with important public interests. 
Conclusion
Access to medicines is integral to the right to 
health. Today, commercial actors utilize trade 
secrecy to hide numerous types of health-related 
data, including clinical trial data, engineering and 
manufacturing data, data related to algorithms and 
machine learning, pricing data, and information 
on corporate wrongdoing. The consequences for 
access to medicines, and thus human rights, are 
significant, undermining patient-level health, the 
development of affordable treatments, and the 
effectiveness of health systems as a whole. This 
paper has proposed several measures that states 
could adopt to protect against overly expansive 
trade secrets regimes. By guarding against the en-
trenchment of trade secret law as creating “rights” 
protected under international and domestic law, 
by protecting the public interest in confidential 
commercial information by allowing or mandating 
data sharing, and by strengthening whistleblower 
protections, countries can protect the pressing 
public need for collaboration and transparency. In 
so doing, countries can expand access to medicines 
and promote the right to health.
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